Search results for "deterrence theory"
showing 8 items of 8 documents
The Modern Strategies in the Cyber Warfare
2018
As there is no generally accepted definition for cyber warfare, it is a term that is quite liberally used in describing events and actions in the digital cyber world. The concept of cyber warfare became extremely popular from 2008 to 2010, partly superseding the previously used concept of information warfare which was launched in the 1990s. For some, cyber warfare is war that is conducted in the virtual domain. For others, it is a counterpart to conventional “kinetic” warfare. According to the OECD’s 2001 report, cyberwar military doctrines resemble those of so-called conventional war: retaliation and deterrence. Researchers agree with the notion that the definition of cyberwar should addre…
The UN in the Lab
2013
We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Deterrence and Prevention. Deterrence – investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack – generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists, while Prevention – investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack – creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coor…
Entry and espionage with noisy signals
2014
Abstract We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off…
IS Security Policy Violations
2012
Employee violations of IS security policies are reported as a key concern for organizations. Although behavioral research on IS security has received increasing attention from IS scholars, little empirical research has examined this problem. To address this research gap, the authors test a model based on Rational Choice Theory RCT-a prominent criminological theory not yet applied in IS-which explains, in terms of a utilitarian calculation, an individual's decision to commit a violation. Empirical results show that the effects of informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits convincingly explain employee IS security policy violations, while the effect of formal sanctions is insig…
Effects of sanctions, moral beliefs, and neutralization on information security policy violations across cultures
2020
Abstract A principal concern of organizations is the failure of employees to comply with information security policies (ISPs). Deterrence theory is one of the most frequently used theories for examining ISP violations, yet studies using this theory have produced mixed results. Past research has indicated that cultural differences may be one reason for these inconsistent findings and have hence called for cross-cultural research on deterrence in information security. To address this gap, we formulated a model including deterrence, moral beliefs, shame, and neutralization techniques and tested it with the employees from 48 countries working for a large multinational company.
Stackelberg Equilibrium with Many Leaders and Followers. The Case of Setup Costs
2016
I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showi…
Common Misunderstandings of Deterrence Theory in Information Systems Research and Future Research Directions
2022
In the 1980s, information systems (IS) borrowed deterrence theory (DT) from the field of criminology to explain information security behaviors (or intention). Today, DT is among the most commonly used theories in IS security research. Our review of IS research applying DT highlights that many fundamental assumptions of DT are unrecognized and therefore unexamined. This may have resulted in misunderstandings and conceptual confusions regarding some of the basic concepts of DT. For example, some IS studies confuse general deterrence with specific deterrence or do not recognize the difference between the two. Moreover, these fundamental assumptions, when directly examined, may provide importan…
Exploring determinants of different information security behaviors
2016
Aim: The aim was to introduce new explanatory construct, namely illegitimate tasks from Stress-as-Offense-to-Self Theory (SOS), to better understand information security behavior (ISB). In addition, more commonly used constructs from Deterrence theory (DT) and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) were used to explain ISB. This study also investigated several behaviors separately to evaluate the generalizability of the behavioral determinants. Methods: Four ISBs, namely general ISP compliance (ISP), not copying sensitive information to the unsecured USB drive (USB), locking or logging out from the computer (LOG), and not writing down passwords (PSW). Formal and informal sanctions from DT, thre…